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Abstract
Albert and Callender have challenged the received view that theories like classical
electrodynamics and non-relativistic quantum mechanics are time-reversal invari-
ant. According to their view of time-reversal invariance, these theories are not
time-reversal invariant. If so, then the important metaphysical implication is that
space-time must have a temporal orientation. There is a large debate on what is
the best way of viewing time-reversal invariance, with many philosophers defend-
ing the standard notion contra Albert and Callender. In this paper, we will not be
concerned so much with that aspect of the debate, but rather focus our attention
on an aspect of the Albert and Callender view that has received little attention,
namely the role of ontology. In the type of theories that are considered the on-
tology is actually underdetermined. We will argue that with a suitable choice of
ontology, these theories are in fact time-reversal invariant according their view.
1 Introduction
Physics textbooks state that theories like Newtonian mechanics, classical electrody-
namics and non-relativistic quantum mechanics are time-reversal invariant. Albert and
Callender disagree [1, 2]. Albert claims that only the former is time-reversal invariant,
while the other two are not [1, p. 14]:
And so [classical electrodynamics] is not invariant under time-reversal. Pe-
riod.
And neither (it turns out) is quantum mechanics, and neither is relativistic
quantum field theory, and neither is general relativity, and neither is super-
gravity, and neither is supersymmetric quantum string theory, and neither
(for that matter) are any of the candidates for a fundamental theory that
anybody has taken seriously since Newton. And everything everybody has
always said to the contrary . . . is wrong.
Callender discusses just non-relativistic quantum mechanics [2], but arrives to the con-
clusion — for the same reason as Albert — that this theory is not time-reversal invariant.
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To explain the disagreement, let us consider Albert, who gives a general discussion
of what time-reversal ought to mean. Consider first Newtonian mechanics. In this case,
Albert actually agrees with the standard conclusion that the theory is time-reversal
invariant, but for different reasons. Newtonian mechanics is about point-particles, which
have definite positions at all times. The Newtonian dynamics determines which particle
trajectories are physically allowed. For Albert, the collection of positions at a time
forms the instantaneous state. The temporal sequence of these instantaneous states
forms a history. Albert takes the time-reversal of a history just to be the history run
backwards. That is, the temporal sequence of instantaneous states is reversed. It is
as if a video of the motion of the particles is run backwards. Newtonian mechanics is
time-reversal invariant because the time-reversed of each dynamically allowed history is
also dynamically allowed. That is, time-reversal turns solutions to Newton’s equation of
motion into solutions. In the example of the video, the time-reversal invariance would
mean that when playing it, we would not able to tell which is the actual time order in
which events have unfolded, since both are physically possible.
Also according to standard view Newtonian mechanics is time-reversal invariant,
but the story is bit different. First of all, in addition to the particle positions, also
the instantaneous velocities are included in the instantaneous state. In this way, the
instantaneous state determines a unique solution to the Newtonian dynamics, i.e., de-
termines a unique dynamically allowed history. Second, according to the standard view,
the time-reversal amounts to reversing the temporal order of the instantaneous state
together with flipping the sign of the velocities at each time. (So the time-reversal is
more than just reversing the order of the instantaneous states.) Despite the differences,
the conclusion is the same: Newtonian mechanics is time-reversal invariant.
Disagreement arises in the case of classical electrodynamics. In this case, the electric
and magnetic field are included in the instantaneous state, both according to Albert and
standard textbooks. So there is no disagreement concerning the electromagnetic part of
the instantaneous state. However, according to the standard view, the magnetic field
should flip sign under time-reversal (like the velocities in Newtonian mechanics). But
for Albert, the magnetic field should not change sign under time reversal [1, p. 20]:
Magnetic fields are not the sorts of things that any proper time-reversal
transformation can possibly turn around. Magnetic fields are not—either
logically or conceptually—the rates of change of anything.
As such Albert concludes that electrodynamics is not time-reversal invariant.
So Albert’s analysis differs from the standard one on two accounts. First, there is the
different notion of instantaneous state. In essence, Albert takes the instantaneous state
at a time to correspond to the ontology at that time (e.g., positions, field configurations,
. . . , at that time). On the other hand, in the standard account, the instantaneous state
is such that it determines a unique solution to the equations of motion and as such
may contain more variables compared to Albert’s instantaneous state (e.g., they may
also include particle velocities, field velocities, . . . ). Second, there is the notion of
time-reversal invariance, which is just the temporal reversal of instantaneous states for
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Albert, whereas there might be an additional (involutive) state transformation at each
instant according to the standard account. The example of electrodynamics shows that
the second difference is essential for the different conclusion concerning the question of
time-reversal invariance.
This issue is important because if a theory is not time-reversal invariant, then time
has an objective direction according to that theory (while it has no bearings on for
example the issue of the arrow of time [1]). There is a large body of interesting literature
defending the standard notion [3–7]. In this paper, we will not so much be concerned
with which is the better notion of time-reversal invariance.1 Albert’s notion certainly
has an appeal. In particular, Albert’s notion just depends on the ontology. So given a
physical theory, which entails a specification of the ontology, the answer to whether the
theory is time-reversal invariant or not is unambiguous. On the other hand, according
to the standard notion of time-reversal, there seems to be some arbitrariness in deciding
what the possible additional transformation of the instantaneous state should be. The
usual attitude seems to be to consider just the additional transformation which makes
the theory time-reversal invariant.
The goal of the paper is to consider the role of the ontology in Albert’s account
(which is an aspect that has been underexposed in the debate, exceptions are [6, 9]).
At least in the case of (classical) field theories, there is a huge underdetermination of
the ontology. Different ontologies yield different instantaneous states in Albert’s sense.
So whether a theory can be considered as time-reversal invariant depends on what is
considered to be the ontology. We will show that theories like electrodynamics and non-
relativistic quantum mechanics are time-reversal invariant in Albert’s sense, provided a
suitable ontology is chosen.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we start with introducing
the relevant notions. Then in section 3, we will consider the ontological implications
concerning time-reversal invariance in the case of the scalar field. In section 4, we will
consider ontologies for classical electrodynamics and quantum mechanics which make
these theories time-reversal invariant in Albert’s sense. With these choices of ontology,
the time-reversal transformation happens to coincide with the standard one (just as it
does in the case of Newtonian mechanics). There are also examples for which this is
not the case. In section 5, we will illustrate this with scalar electrodynamics, which
describes a scalar field interacting with an electromagnetic field. An ontology will be
presented for which Albert’s notion of time-reversal does not coincide with the standard
one, but rather with the joint transformation of time-reversal and charge conjugation.
We conclude in section 6.
1The standard model of particle physics is actually not time-reversal invariant even according to
the standard notion. It is merely invariant under the joint transformation of time-reversal, charge
conjugation and parity-reversal. The metaphysical implications have been explored in [6, 8].
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2 Instantaneous state and time-reversal
Let us first formalize some notions. The instantaneous state at a certain time t is denoted
by S(t). As mentioned before, for Albert the instantaneous state at a time represents
the ontology at that time, whereas the standard notion of instantaneous state (in this
context) includes an extra specification at that time such that for a deterministic theory
the instantaneous state together with the equations of motion determines a unique
solution. (Albert elaborates more on the notion, but this is sufficient for our purposes.)
We will add the subscripts a and s and write Sa(t) and Ss(t) to refer to respectively
Albert’s notion and the standard notion of state.
For a given history, i.e., t → S(t), the time-reversed history is denoted as t →
T (S)(t). For Albert, the time-reversed history is t → Ta(Sa)(t), with Ta(Sa)(t) =
Sa(−t).2 According to the standard notion, given a history t→ Ss(t), the time-reversed
history is Ts(Ss)(t) = S
T
s (−t), where the superscript T denotes some additional involu-
tive operation on each instantaneous state in addition to flipping the sign of the time
argument.
A theory is called time-reversal invariant if for each dynamically allowed history, i.e.,
each possible solution to the equations of motion, its time-reversed is also dynamically
allowed.
Let us give some examples. First consider Newtonian mechanics. The ontology is
given by point-particles with positions (X1, . . . ,Xn). The equations of motion read
mk
d2Xk
dt2
= −∇kV (X1, . . . ,Xn). (1)
According to the standard notion, the instantaneous state at a time t is the collection
of positions and velocities at that time, i.e.,
Ss(t) = (X1(t), . . . ,Xn(t),V1(t), . . . ,Vn(t)) (2)
and the time-reversal operation is
Ts : Ss(t)→ STs (−t) = (X1(−t), . . . ,Xn(−t),−V1(−t), . . . ,−Vn(−t)). (3)
Newtonian mechanics is time-reversal invariant in this sense. According to Albert, the
instantaneous state at time t is
Sa(t) = (X1(t), . . . ,Xn(t)). (4)
It does not include the instantaneous velocities. Namely, the velocities are not part of
ontology, but of course they are determined by the ontology through the time derivative
of the history. The time-reversal operation is
Ta : Sa(t)→ Sa(−t) = (X1(−t), . . . ,Xn(−t)). (5)
2We consider only time-translation invariant theories, so that there is nothing special about t = 0
in the definition of a time-reversed history.
4
The implied transformation of the velocities is of course as in (3). So, also according to
Albert, Newtonian mechanics is time-reversal invariant.
Let us now turn to classical electrodynamics. In this case, the ontology is given by
point-particles together with the electric and magnetic field E(x, t) and B(x, t). The
laws of motion are given by the Lorentz force law
mk
d2Xk
dt2
= ek
[
E(Xk, t) +
dXk
dt
×B(Xk, t)
]
, (6)
together with Maxwell’s equations
∇ · E = ρ, ∇ ·B = 0, (7)
∇× E = −∂B
∂t
, ∇×B = J + ∂E
∂t
, (8)
where ρ(x, t) =
∑
k ekδ(x−Xk(t)) and J(x, t) =
∑
k ek
dXk(t)
dt
δ(x−Xk(t)) are respectively
the charge density and the charge current. The instantaneous state is
Ss(t) = (X1(t), . . . ,Xn(t),V1(t), . . . ,Vn(t),E(x, t),B(x, t)) (9)
and under time reversal
Ts : Ss(t)→ STs (−t) = (X1(−t), . . . ,Xn(−t),−V1(−t), . . . ,−Vn(−t),E(x,−t),−B(x,−t)).
(10)
It is crucial that the magnetic field flips sign under this operation. It guarantees that
the equations of motion are time-reversal invariant.
Albert takes the state to be
Sa(t) = (X1(t), . . . ,Xn(t),E(x, t),B(x, t)) (11)
and under time reversal
Ta : Sa(t)→ Sa(−t) = (X1(−t), . . . ,Xn(−t),E(x,−t),B(x,−t)). (12)
There is no sign flip of the magnetic field and Albert concludes that the equations of
motion are not time-reversal invariant; the transformation (12) is not a symmetry of
the equations of motion (i.e., does not map solutions to solutions). The standard time-
reversal transformation is still a symmetry of the equations of motion, but Albert just
would not call that time-reversal symmetry, because the magnetic field is not the rate
of change of anything.
In non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the situation is similar (and is detailed by
Callender [2]). To avoid the interpretational issues that arise in this context, we will
regard the Schro¨dinger equation as just a classical field equation. For simplicity, we
will also consider just a single particle. The ontology in this case is given by the wave
function ψ(x, t) and the Schro¨dinger equation is
i
∂ψ
∂t
= − 1
2m
∇2ψ + V (x)ψ. (13)
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In this case,
Ss(t) = Sa(t) = ψ(x, t). (14)
The Schro¨dinger equation is invariant under the standard time-reversal operation
Ts : Ss(t)→ STs (−t) = ψ∗(x,−t), (15)
but not under Albert’s notion of the time-reversal operation
Ta : Sa(t)→ Sa(−t) = ψ(x,−t). (16)
3 Ontological underdetermination: the case of the
scalar field
There tends to be an underdetermination in the ontology of physical theories. This is
especially so in the case of field theories. In the case of, say, Newtonian mechanics,
there seems to be little flexibility in the ontology. Newtonian mechanics is regarded
as a theory about point-particles moving in physical space. One could consider other
ontologies, but these seem to be contrived. For example, rather than considering physical
space as the physical arena, one could consider, say, velocity phase space, which is the
space of collections of positions and velocities, as the true physical arena. (The equation
dX/dt = V would then be regarded as a law rather than a definition of the velocity.)
While such a view is arguably empirically indistinguishable from the standard view, it
would be rather far removed from our everyday experience of the world. But taking the
latter ontology seriously would mean that the theory is no longer time-reversal invariant
in Albert’s sense.
In the case of field theories there seems to be a huge underdetermination. As a
simple example, consider the theory of a real scalar field. Usually the ontology is given
by a scalar field φ(x, t), satisfying the Klein-Gordon equation
∂µ∂
µφ+m2φ = 0. (17)
But one could also consider a phase space representation, with an ontology given by the
fields (φ(x, t), pi(x, t)), satisfying
φ˙ = pi, p˙i = ∇2φ−m2φ. (18)
While in the context of classical mechanics we consider a phase space ontology artificial
because the physical arena is then phase space and not physical space, there is no such
issue here, because the phase space variables are still fields in physical space. So the
physical arena is still physical space. (In this case, the choice of a reference frame to
define the time derivative may be regarded as unsatisfactory for a Lorentz invariant
theory. This is an issue we will come back to later.)
The scalar field theory can also be written in terms of a 5-component spinor ψ(x, t)
which satisfies the Kemmer equation [10,11]
iβµ∂µψ −mψ = 0. (19)
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This is a Dirac-like equation, which is manifestly Lorentz invariant just as (17). This
theory is completely equivalent to the Klein-Gordon theory. In a particular representa-
tion of the Kemmer matrices βµ, the spinor takes the form ψ = (∂µφ,mφ)
T . Despite
the equivalence, this form of the theory is hardly used, due to its greater complexity.
However, this is not a reason not to consider the Kemmer spinor as providing the actual
ontology. Actually, when it comes to spin-1/2 particles, the Dirac equation which is
a first-order differential equation (which is the analogue of (19)) is the one commonly
used, instead of the somewhat simpler second-order Van der Waerden equation for a
two-component spinor [12] (which is the analogue of (17)).
So for the scalar field theory, we have three possible candidates for the ontology and
hence for the state in Albert’s sense. Namely,
S(1)a (t) = φ(x, t), S
(2)
a (t) = (φ(x, t), pi(x, t)), S
(3)
a (t) = ψ(x, t). (20)
Only the first one yields time-reversal symmetry in Albert’s sense. The time-reversal
operation Ta in this case also corresponds to the standard one. According to the standard
notion, the theory is time-reversal invariant for all these choices of ontology. (Similarly,
in the case of a (free) spin-1/2 particle, for which the state Sa can be taken to be a
Dirac spinor or a Van der Waerden spinor, only the latter will amount to time-reversal
invariance in Albert’s sense.)
So whether a theory is time-reversal invariant or not in Albert’s sense depends on
the choice of ontology. In the case of a classical field theory, different possible ontologies
seem possible with no clear physical preference. (Even the requirement of manifest
Lorentz covariance leaves options S
(1)
a and S
(3)
a .) In the next section, we will show that
we can exploit the ambiguity in ontology in the case of classical electrodynamics and
non-relativistic quantum mechanics to choose one such that the theory is time-reversal
invariant in Albert’s sense.
4 Ontology of electrodynamics and quantum me-
chanics
Maxwell’s equations imply3
B = − 1∇2∇×
(
J +
∂E
∂t
)
. (21)
This expression can be used to eliminate the magnetic field from Maxwell’s equation
and the Lorentz force law. Maxwell’s equations are then expressed as
∇ · E = ρ, ∂
2E
∂t2
−∇2E = −∇ρ− ∂J
∂t
. (22)
3The action of 1/∇2 is defined in terms of the Green function of the Laplacian, i.e., (1/∇2)f(x) =
− 14pi
∫
d3yf(y)/|x−y|. The expression (21) follows if the fields fall off sufficiently fast at spatial infinity.
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The resulting theory is completely equivalent to the original one, using (21). This
suggest that one can take the ontology of the electromagnetic field to be given by just
the electric field, so that
Sa(t) = (X1(t), . . . ,Xn(t),E(x, t)), (23)
with the field equations given by (29). This theory is time-reversal invariant in Albert’s
sense. There is no problem with the magnetic field because it is simply not part of the
ontology (and the theory). One could define the magnetic field as (21) in terms of the
particles and the electric field. From that definition it follows that under time-reversal
of the state Sa, the magnetic field will flip sign. So on this view the magnetic field does
play the role of a velocity, since it is a linear combination of the velocities of the particles
(through the charge current) and the electric field.
Note that we could also have eliminated the electric field in terms of the magnetic
field. But then the resulting theory would not be time-reversal invariant. So there is
no technical reason why it is more natural to assume the ontology to be given by the
electric field rather than the magnetic field.
Nevertheless, there is an issue with this ontology, which is clearly spelled out in [6]. It
is an ontology that is suitable for Newtonian space-time, but not so much for a Minkowski
space-time, which is the natural space-time in this context due to the Lorenz invariance
of electrodynamics. While the theory in terms of just the electric field is still Lorentz
invariant, the transformation of the electric field is rather complicated and makes the
Lorentz invariance not manifest. So rather then having a 3-vector as constituting the
fundamental ontology, it would be more desirable to have Lorentz-covariant objects, like
the electromagnetic field tensor. However, this tensor transforms non-trivially according
to the standard time-reversal transformation.
A manifestly Lorentz invariant theory that is time-reversal invariant in Albert’s sense
could be obtained by completely removing the fields from the ontology, so that only the
particles remain. This is attempted in the Wheeler-Feynman theory [13,14]. To see how
this theory is obtained, consider the covariant form of electrodynamics
∂µF
µν(x) = jν(x), mk
d2Xµk (sk)
ds2k
= ekF
µ
ν(Xk(sk))
dXν(sk)
dsk
, (24)
where Xµk (sk) is the worldline of the k-th particle, parameterized by its proper time sk,
Aµ(x) is the electromagnetic potential and F µν = ∂µAν − ∂νAµ is the electromagnetic
field tensor, with Ei = F0i and Bi = −ijkF jk/2, and jµ(x) =
∑
k ek
∫
ds
dXµk (s)
ds
δ(x −
Xk(s)) the charge current. Assuming the Lorenz gauge ∂µA
µ = 0, the Maxwell equations
can be written as
Aµ(x) = jµ(x). (25)
The potential can be decomposed as AµF +A
µ
M with A
µ
F a field satisfying the free Maxwell
equations AµF (x) = 0 and
AµM(x) =
1
j
µ(x), (26)
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where 1/ denotes integration over a Green’s function G of the d’Alembertian. There
are various choices for a Green’s function G; one could take the retarded G−, the ad-
vanced G+ or linear combinations. Different choices will correspond to differences in the
free field AµF . Wheeler and Feynman chose G = (G+ +G−)/2. Eq. (26) is then taken as
a definition of AµM , rather than as (part of) a dynamical equation. (In the Lorentz force
law in (24), the self-force is subtracted to avoid infinities, but we will leave this aside
here.) Furthermore, it is assumed there are no free fields, i.e., AµF = 0. By eliminating
the fields, one is left with a theory of just particles. So,
Sa(t) = (X1(t), . . . ,Xn(t)). (27)
This theory is time-reversal invariant under Ta, in particular since A
µ
M transforms as
A0M(x, t)→ A0M(x,−t), AiM(x, t)→ −AiM(x,−t) (28)
under time-reversal of the particles, which is the standard transformation and which
hence implies a sign flip of the magnetic field.4 (For the time-reversal invariance it is
also important that the particular Green function is (G+ + G−)/2 chosen. Another
choice would not have made it time-reversal invariant. Concerning the free field AµF ,
if it is introduced as part of the ontology, then this will make the theory not time-
reversal invariant in Albert’s sense, because of the Lorentz force law. The free Maxwell
equations AµF = 0 by themselves are time-reversal invariant. Of course, one could
consider another possible ontology for the free fields, but it is unclear what could serve
as a Lorentz covariant piece of ontology.)
There is debate about the empirical adequacy of the theory, but the important point
for our purposes is that it is a theory that is manisfestly Lorentz invariant and that
it is time-reversal invariant in Albert’s sense. Possibly other choices of ontologies are
possible that achieve this and perhaps also include a free field.
Allori [9] considers yet another option to have time-reversal invariance in Albert’s
sense, which she attributes to Horwich [15]. On this view, the electric and magnetic
field are not part of the fundamental ontology. The ontology is just particles, like in the
Wheeler-Feynman theory. But unlike in the latter, the electromagnetic field still appears
in Horwich’s account of the theory. But the field rather has a nomological character
than an ontological one, i.e., the field plays a role in the dynamics of the particle.
The particles are said to constitute the primitive ontology. The fields then transform
the way they do under time-reversal just to have the primitive ontology transform the
right way. The approach we consider here is different. We have not relegated some
4Interestingly, in his defense of the standard notion of time-reversal invariance, Earman also considers
AµM [3]. He proposes to take (25) as “the definition of the four-potential arising from [the current]”.
This could be read in the sense considered here, i.e., that there is no independent reality for the
field. However, Earman seems to have had merely the intention of showing that if one accepts the
usual transformation properties of the particles, then one should also accept the usual transformation
properties of the vector potential. But this akin to stating that the vector potential should transform
the usual way, just because that makes the theory time-reversal invariant. Because if AµM (or the
electromagnetic field) is taken as part of the ontology, then (25) should be taken as a law.
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parts of the standard ontology to the nomological domain, but rather have eliminated
them completely (i.e., also from the dynamics). For example, in our first proposal, the
magnetic field was no longer part of the theory, neither on the ontological nor on the
nomological level.
The non-relativistic Schro¨dinger equation can be dealt with similarly. We can write
ψ = ψr + iψi, with ψr and ψi real, and eliminate the imaginary part to obtain
5
∂2ψr
∂t2
= −H2ψr H = − 1
2m
∇2 + V (x). (29)
The Schro¨dinger equation can be recovered by defining6
ψi =
1
H
∂tψr. (30)
So ψi roughly plays the role of the time derivative of ψr. Taking the ontology to be
given just by ψr makes the theory time-reversal invariant in Albert’s sense.
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Note that by eliminating the magnetic field in electrodynamics or the imaginary
part of the wave function in quantum mechanics, we have passed from a wave equation
which is a first-order in time differential equation to one that is second order. One way
to obtain such equations is through the Hamiltonian formulation of the theory. In the
reduced phase space formalism all redundant degrees of freedom are eliminated.
5 Time-reversal theories with different notion of time-
reversal
In the previous section, we have provided examples of ontologies that make electrody-
namics and the non-relativistic Schro¨dinger equation time-reversal invariant in Albert’s
5This equation has been considered by a number of people, including Schro¨dinger himself [16]. In
particular, this equation is encountered in the reduced phase space formulation of the Schro¨dinger
theory [17]. In the reduced phase space formulation, ψr and ψi become canonically conjugate variables.
An inverse Legendre transformation leads to the Lagrangian for just ψr, whose Euler-Lagrange equation
corresponds to (29). Actually, the second order equations for electromagnetism could be obtained
similarly since the electric and magnetic field are (approximately) canonically conjugate.
6Where 1/H is defined in terms of the Green function for the Hamiltonian H.
7Quantum mechanics actually entails much more than just the Schro¨dinger equation. What this is
depends on the version of quantum mechanics. Let us briefly say something about the time-reversal
invariance for the three main attempts that solve the measurement problem, namely the many worlds
theory, spontaneous collapse theories and Bohmian mechanics. In the many worlds theory, the ontology
is given by just the wave function and hence it can be considered time-reversal invariant in Albert’s
sense by taking the ontology to be given by just the real part of the wave function . In spontaneous
collapse theories, the Schro¨dinger evolution of the wave function is interrupted by collapses which are
stochastic. This entails further discussion of the notion of time reversal invariance which we will not
consider. Usually, the theory is not considered time-reversal invariant even in the standard sense [2],
but see also [18]. In Bohmian mechanics there are also actual point-particles in addition to the wave
function. The Bohmian dynamics is time-reversal invariant in the standard sense [19] and also in
Albert’s sense if the ontology above is adopted.
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sense. This was done by respectively removing the magnetic field and the imaginary
part of the wave function as part of the ontology. In these cases, Albert’s time-reversal
transformation was in agreement with the standard time-reversal transformation. How-
ever, this need not always be the case. Yet the theory could be time-reversal invari-
ant according to both notions. Consider for example, again a scalar field φ satisfying
the Klein-Gordon equation (17), but now a complex scalar field one, which describes
a charged spinless field. According to the standard notion of time-reversal, the field
should transform as φ(x, t) → φ∗(x,−t), whereas according to Albert’s notion, taking
Sa(t) = φ(x, t), Ta : φ(x, t)→ φ(x,−t). So there is disagreement about what counts as
time-reversal. Yet, both transformations are symmetries of the Klein-Gordon equation
(i.e., they map solutions to solutions) and hence the conclusion in both cases is that the
theory is time-reversal invariant. (The same is true for the Van der Waerden equation
that was mentioned in section 3. With the Van der Waerden spinor as ontology, the
theory is time-reversal invariant in Albert’s sense, even though his notion would be at
variance with the standard notion.)
The previous example can be extended to include an electromagnetic field. In terms
of the scalar field φ and the vector potential Aµ, this theory (called scalar electrody-
namics) has the equations of motion
DµD
µφ+m2φ = 0, ∂µF
µν = jν , (31)
where Dµ = ∂µ + ieAµ is the covariant derivative and
jµ = ie [φ∗Dµφ− φ(Dµφ)∗] (32)
is the charge current. The theory is invariant under the standard time-reversal operation
ψ(x, t)→ ψ∗(x,−t), A0(x, t)→ A0(x,−t), Ai(x, t)→ −Ai(x,−t). (33)
But taking φ and Aµ as the ontology does not make this theory time-reversal invariant
in Albert’s sense.
Consider now the temporal gauge A0 = 0. Then the equations of motion are
φ¨−D ·Dφ+m2φ = 0, A +∇(∇ ·A) = j, −∇ · A˙ = j0, (34)
with now D =∇− ieA and the charge density and 3-current respectively given by
j0 = ie
(
φ∗φ˙− φφ˙∗
)
, j = ie [φDφ∗ − φ∗Dφ] . (35)
Taking the state to be
Sa(t) = (φ(x, t),A(x, t)) , (36)
then it is readily checked that the theory is invariant under Albert’s time-reversal oper-
ation Ta : Sa(t)→ Sa(−t). Nevertheless, this is a symmetry different from the standard
time-reversal symmetry (33).
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The transformation Ta considered here actually corresponds to the joint time-reversal
(T) and charge (C) conjugation in the standard picture. Namely, under charge conjuga-
tion, one has φ→ φ∗ and Aµ → −Aµ. So in this case, Albert’s time-reversal transforma-
tion Ta agrees with the TC transformation of the standard picture. (This explains why
under Ta, the charge current in (35) flips sign, i.e., it transforms as j0(x, t)→ −j0(x,−t),
j(x, t)→ −j(x,−t).) That the TC transformation can actually be considered to be the
time-reversal transformation is also the case in Feynman’s view of time-reversal, as
explained in detail in [6].
6 Conclusion
Prima facie, the views of Albert and Callender on the notion of time-reversal invari-
ance seems to lead to the conclusion that theories like electrodynamics and quantum
mechanics are not time-reversal invariant and hence imply a temporal orientation of
space-time. However, their notion also depends on the ontology of the theory, which is
underdetermined. We have argued that ontologies can be considered for electrodynamics
and quantum mechanics so that they are time-reversal invariant. As such, whether one
adopts the notion of time-reversal invariance of Albert and Callander or the standard
one, the conclusion can be the same, namely that these theories do not imply a temporal
orientation.
We do not want to suggest that any of these ontologies are natural. We merely
wanted to point out that such ontologies do exist. In particular, with exception from
the Wheeler-Feynman theory, we have paid no attention to the relativistic character of
electrodynamics. The proposed ontologies for electrodynamics where often couched in
a Newtonian picture of space-time rather than a Minkowskian one. So apart from the
time-reversal invariance also the Lorentz invariance should be taken into account.
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